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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee

:

v.

:

RANDY FETCH JEFFS,

:

Appellant

CASE NO. 20090737-SC

:

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, UTAH ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter under Utah Code Ann.
§78A-3-102(3)(h).
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT
Amicus supports the position of the Appellee, real party in interest Salt Lake
County, as it pertains to the requirement under the Utah Indigent Defense Act that an
indigent defendant represented by retained counsel must show a compelling need in order
to access county-paid defense services.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Amicus adopts the issue as framed by Appellee Salt Lake County in its brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amicus adopts the statement of the case as stated by Appellee Salt Lake County.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Amicus adopts the state of facts as stated by Appellee Salt Lake County.
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
Following the decision by this Court in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795
(2000), the Utah State Legislature sought to formulate a process whereby the counties
could control the potential costs associated with paying for indigent counsel and services.
It was readily apparent to the Legislature that under the statutory interpretation in Burns
such costs could wreck havoc with county budgets since counties would have little
control over what services private attorneys would seek to use.

Accordingly, they

amended the Utah Indigent Defense Act to provide counties options on how to address
the payment for such services. One such option was to pay an association of attorneys or
a legal aid association to provide both attorney and defense services. Organization of
either association would be the sole source for indigent defense services absent a showing
by the defendant of a compelling reason to depart from that plan. Such a practice enables
the counties to plan into their budgets on a yearly basis the anticipated costs for such
services. By limiting the scope of indigent defense service providers, counties are able to
balance more accurately the counties' budgetary needs against those of truly indigent
defendants who retain counsel in their budgeting process. The requirement to show
compelling reasons to deviate from the counties' indigent defense contracts provides the
defendant with the opportunity to petition the court to review his or her individual
circumstances, while still forging a workable system for responsible public entities.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE BUDGETING PROCESS OF COUNTIES MANDATED BY LAW
REQUIRES COUNTIES TO ESTIMATE EXPENDITURES THAT DO NOT
EXCEED ESTIMATED RECEIPTS.
In 1975 the Utah State Legislature enacted the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for

Counties, Utah Code Ann. § 17-36-1 et seq., in an effort to provide a uniform process for
counties to develop budgets. This process requires the county to lay out a financial plan
by having departments and divisions submit anticipated expenses and receipts, which are
compiled into a tentative budget prior to November 1 of each year. Utah Code Ann. §
17-36-10(1). The auditor prepares the tentative budget pending final adoption by the
county legislative body. The tentative budget is posted and subject to a public hearing,
following which the county commission or council must adopt a final budget on or before
December 31 of each year. Utah Code Ann. § 17-36-15.

By law, "the total of

appropriated expenditures shall be equal to the total of anticipated revenues." Utah Code
Ann. § 17-36-9(l)(b).
While the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act recognizes the need to retain rainy-day
funds and other reserves, it sets a number of limitations or prohibitions on how such
funds may be accumulated.

Any surpluses provided for may be kept only for specific

purposes which generally include a reserve for emergency expenditures and to cover
unanticipated future deficits. Utah Code Ann. § 17-36-16.

6

II.

THE UTAH INDIGENT DEFENSE ACT AS AMENDED IN ANSWER TO
STATE V. BURNS, PROVIDED A STRUCTURE FOR COUNTIES TO
DEVELOP
A
WAY
TO
CONTROL
INDIGENT
DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES.
In 2000, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. Bums, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795

(2000), which dealt with an indigent defendant who was able to obtain private counsel
through monies paid by her father.

The trial court determined that Ms. Burns would be

entitled to indigent benefits only if she accepted the attorney services of the Salt Lake
Legal Defender's office. Id. at ^f 7.
This Court held that based on the version of the Indigent Defense Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-32-1, et seq.9 then in effect, the only requirement for receiving state-paid
expert witnesses was proof of necessity. Id. at ^j 32. The Court directed its attention to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 which provided the minimum standards for the defense of
indigents in criminal cases. Id. at f 26. Those standards included providing the
investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense.

The statute also

provided for two options for providing those minimum standards: first, by authorizing the
court to appoint a qualified attorney and awarding him or her reasonable compensation
and expenses, and second, by arranging to provide those services through non-profit legal
aid or other associations. Id. at ^ 26. The Court further stated that nothing in the statute
conditioned the availability of basic tools of defense on the acceptance of the contracted
public defender - in that case, LDA. Id. at f 28. The Court then determined that Burns
was entitled to a hearing to determine whether she was indigent regardless of who paid

7

her attorney's fees and remanded it back to the trial court for such determination. Id. at \
32.
Following Burns, the Utah State Legislature in 2001 amended the statute and
added some significant changes to the Act, currently found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-32101 et seq. The Legislature clarified how counties could fulfill their obligation to provide
the defense services by authorizing them to do so through a legal aid association; one or
more defense associations or attorneys along with qualified defense resources; or by
allowing the court to assign a qualified attorney. The Legislature amplified the changes
by requiring the court to appoint either the legal aid association or contracted association
or attorneys if the county had provided for such. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(2)(a)(b)
and (c).
The obvious legislative intent was to provide counties with the ability to provide
indigent services in various ways and to require the courts to use the contracted services
adopted by the county. This is reinforced by Section 77-32-306(4), which provides:
"When a county or municipality has contracted under Subsection (l)(a) to provide the
legal counsel and defense resources required by this chapter, the contracted legal aid
association or attorneys and contracted defense resources are the exclusive source from
which the legal defense may be provided, unless the court finds a compelling reason for
the appointment of noncontracting attorneys and defense resources...."

(Emphasis

added).
The plain language of the statute provides a plan for the counties to adopt an
indigent defense strategy through contracting with associations or attorneys for the
8

provision of both counsel and defense resources. The only way to deviate from the
contracted plan would be to go before the court and show a compelling reason to appoint
or provide for other counsel or resources.

III.

THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT WAS TO CREATE A STRUCTURE
THAT PROVIDES THE SOLE SOURCE FOR AN INDIGENT'S DEFENSE
ABSENT COMPELLING REASONS.
The legislative intent to do what has been described above is evident from the

introduction of the bill. While Appellant seems to agree that one purpose of the
legislation is to hold down costs to governmental entities, he seems to limit that
purpose to paying for out of state witnesses. Part of Senator Hilly ard's comments on
the floor seems to support that conclusion to a degree. Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19.
However, the comments of Representative Curtis in the House of Representatives is a
much clearer statement of the Legislature's intent.
Senate Bill 154 deals with a recent Supreme Court decision that allows
defendants to utilize publicly funded expert witnesses and investigators
even though the defendant may be financially able to retain private counsel.
It allows the cities and counties to control the costs of those indigent
defense services by providing expert witnesses and investigators in one of
three ways: it can pay for it on a case-by-case basis whenever a court
decides...at whatever a court decides is an appropriate level; ah, it can
arrange for contracts with experts or groups of experts and investigators at
the best government rate that that entity that is providing the indigent
services can obtain and absent a compelling reason, the defendants would
be required to use those that the, that the county has contracted with, or if in
like Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County, a governmental entity contracts
with a non-profit legal aid or some other association that provides both
counsel and defense resources, the defendant must use the legal aid
association for the total defense package and defense resources unless the
defendant can demonstrate a compelling reason for going outside the
system and the compelling reason is defined in the statute on lines 23, urn,
so it reaffirms the legislature's intent to make the legal defender's
9

association the sole source for defense of indigents unless the court finds a
compelling reason otherwise. Essentially what this is dealing with, the
courts have said when you have indigent defense counsel which is the
attorney, you also get defense resources and sometimes in a trial you have
very expensive expert witnesses and others, and this tries to address how
those are appointed, like indigent defense counsel. Thank you Mr. Speaker.
(Emphasis added).
See House Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/26/01.1
The statements of Representative Curtis illustrate that the purpose was to do
exactly what the Court in Burns said was not clearly stated in the statute at the time, i.e.,
create an indigent defense scheme that enables the counties to require that those receiving
county-funded counsel and resources should be represented by the contracted entities.
The only way to depart from that process was to show the appointing court a compelling
reason to allow the appointment of counsel or allocation of defense resources.

IV.

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE THE NEED TO ADHERE TO
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND A COMPELLING REASON
STANDARD.
Several examples of the costs and the manner in which counties in Utah provide

indigent services illustrate the need the Legislature sought to fill when it amended the
Utah Indigent Services Act.

Two of the larger counties, Davis and Utah, will be

examined along with three of the smaller counties, Wasatch, Sanpete, and Tooele.
Utah County has contracted with an association of attorneys for the provision of
its indigent services the Utah County Public Defender Association. Their 2010 contract

1

Available at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/au&
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provided an amount of $3,098,449 for representation by twelve full time attorneys and
subcontracted conflict attorneys. The contract includes any necessary defense costs.2 It is
left to the Public Defender Association to determine the allocation of funds from the total
amounts paid by Utah County.
In Davis County, thirteen attorneys contract separately to provide defense services,
at a cost of $1,047,068 to the County. Two of the attorneys act as coordinators; one for
the adult system and one for the juvenile system. The attorneys are not full time and each
has a private law practice. Additional funds are provided for the use of the contracting
attorneys to provide defense resources in the amount of $136,964, with an additional
$35,000 set aside for mental health evaluations and hearings.
Tooele County pays a total of $260,000 for the compensation of six public
defenders, along with conflicts counsel and appellate work. Defense costs are budgeted
at a total amount of $5,500. Wasatch County's total indigent defense budget is $68,000
which includes both attorney fees and defense costs. They pay their conflict attorneys at
a rate of $75.00 per hour. Sanpete is the smallest of the counties in population and its
budget for attorneys is $80,000, with $3,000 budgeted for defense costs.
While the costs of each county obviously vary, each county tries to predict the
expenses for both attorney costs and related defense costs and provide for them on a
yearly basis in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act.

2

County allocations for public defender contracts were provided by the County
Attorney's Office of each county represented.
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This attempt to solidify the manner of paying for those services is consistent with the
provisions of the Utah Indigent Defense Act.
A significant stumbling block for counties trying to predict indigent defense costs
is the attempt by indigent defendants who obtain private counsel to force counties to pay
their defense costs.

While counties can anticipate the costs associated with their

contracted defense attorneys, it may be impossible to anticipate how many indigent
defendants may receive funds to retain private counsel. This supports the requirement to
provide a compelling reason to depart from the unified approach for attorney services and
defense costs envisioned by the Indigent Defense Act.
A historical sample of cases where private counsel was retained and yet requested
county-paid defense costs bolsters the need for using and enforcing the compelling reason
standard. Trial courts throughout the state have been approached by private counsel to
pay such costs. The initial reaction of judges to the Burns decision resulted in the
provision of costs upon a mere finding of indigency, notwithstanding representation by
private counsel.
For example, in 2000 in Davis County, several privately-retained attorneys sought
and received court approval for the payment of defense costs. In one case involving the
death of a child the defendant through family and friend contributions had hired private
counsel. The defendant was found to be indigent and counsel sought payment of defense
expert witness fees, including one expert from Virginia. Ultimately the court authorized
the payment of approximately $25,000 for three experts. A second case involved a
3

See State v. JeriDaines, Second District Court Case No. 001701509.
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defendant charged with automobile homicide, a second degree felony, in which
defendant's mother had paid for the attorney's fees 4. Again a motion was brought
pursuant to Burns resulting in the award of $3,000 in expert witness fees. In another
murder case the parents of the defendant paid for the attorney, who then sought and
received county funds to pay investigator and expert fees, including an out-of-state
expert. The total fees paid in that case approached $55,0005.
Relying on earlier court rulings, Davis County initially failed to raise the new
statutory compelling reason standard and relied on the need to find the expenses
reasonably necessary under the statute.

A 2002 Davis County district court ruling

authorizing expert witness fees to be paid resulted in a payment in excess of $50,000.6
This ruling was made despite the defendant receiving the benefit of private counsel
through a gift of $100,000 to pay for attorney's fees only. It is difficult to see how a
defendant who has managed to raise can show a compelling need to go outside the
statutory plan and require the county to pay for the rest of the defense costs.
A 2005 Davis County case illustrates a second problem in these cases.7 The
defendant was charged with child abuse homicide and in April of that year hired private
counsel. Defendant moved for the payment of an expert witness from outside of the
state. A contract with the County was entered for payment of up to $35,000 in expert
witness fees. The contract was approved on September 13 and private counsel withdrew

4

See State v. Adam Harding, Second District Court Case No. 001701229.
Sec State v. Todd Rettenberger, Second District Court Case No. 971700057.
6
See State v. Robert Weitzel, Second District Court Case No. 991700983.
7
See State v. Dominic Plescia, Second District Court Case No. 051700557.

5
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on September 28, due to the failure of defendant to continue to pay attorney's fees. At
that point, a public defender was appointed. This required an appropriation of $35,000
from the contingency emergency funds maintained used to pay for unforeseen expenses
to pay for the expert. Recently, Davis County has asserted the analysis expressed in this
brief and relied upon the statutory requirement for finding a compelling reason to justify
the expenditure of public funds for defense expenses where defendants are represented by
private counsel.
These problems, however, are not limited to Davis County. Just this year in Salt
Lake County, a noted defense counsel reportedly received a retainer fee of $100,000 in a
non-homicide case but still brought a motion for the payment of fees for an expert
o

witness. Although retained counsel withdrew the motion before hearing, it illustrates the
extent to which defense attorneys are willing to press for the county to bear such costs.
Several other instances in Salt Lake County, including the matters currently on appeal,
also illustrate the circumstances which face courts in making such determinations. Most
recent cases have resulted in courts in that district failing to grant motions to pay defense
expenses due to a failure to find a compelling reason to justify the payment of expenses.9
Judges faced with no standard other than indigency coupled with necessity, are
naturally reticent to refuse requests by indigent defendants for funding of defense costs.
However, the Legislature provided an analytical and structural process to make an
appropriate determination of whether such costs should be paid. By creating a preference
8

SzeState v. Robert Michael Sheehan, Third District Court # 061908535.
Based on a conversation with Donald Hansen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney whose
division handles such matters.

9
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for county-funded public defenders, the Legislature provided counties with the ability to
reasonably predict and plan for those costs on an annual basis. In so doing, however, the
Legislature also balanced the need of indigent defendants who are able to retain counsel,
by allowing county-paid defense services where there is a compelling need to do so.
CONCLUSION
The county budgeting process requires a yearly budget where receipts and
expenditures are equalized. Counties are required by state law to fund both defense
attorney and defense costs for indigent defendants. The Legislature has addressed the
method for providing those services by enacting the Utah Indigent Defense Act. That
Act provides that if counties engage a legal defense association or an association of
attorneys and its attendant defense cost provisions, judges shall appoint such attorneys as
counsel for the indigent. The Act does allow a departure from that methodology by
permitting the court on a showing of compelling reasons to order the county to pay
defense costs where an indigent defendant has retained counsel.

This standard and

methodology protects the public funds of the counties and enables them to plan for the
reasonable and expected costs associated with providing counsel and defense costs for
indigent defendants, while at the same time accommodating truly special cases.
DATED this J ^

day of November, 2010.

(

/

UT^^SSO^

WILLIAM K. MCGUIRE
Chief Deputy Davis County Attorney
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17-36-10, Preparation of tentative budget.
(1) On or before the first day of the next to last month of every fiscal period, the
budget officer shall prepare for the next budget period and file with the governing body a
tentative budget for each fond for which a budget is required.
(2) The tentative budget shall set forth in tabular form:
(a) actual revenues and expenditures in the last completed fiscal period;
(b) estimated total revenues and expenditures for the current fiscal period;
(c) the estimated available revenues and expenditures for the ensuing budget period
computed by determining:
(i) the estimated expenditure for each fund after review of each departmental budget
request;
(ii) (A) the total revenue requirements of the fund;
(B) the part of the total revenue that will be derived from revenue sources other than
property tax; and
(C) the part of the total revenue that must be derived from property taxes;
(d) if required by the governing body, actual performance experience to the extent
available in work units, unit costs, man hours, and man years for each budgeted fund that
includes an appropriation for salaries or wages for the last completed fiscal period and the
first eight months of the current fiscal period if the county is on an annual fiscal period,
or the first 20 months of the current fiscal period if the county is on a biennial fiscal
period, together with the total estimated performance data of like character for the current
fiscal period and for the ensuing budget period.
(3) The budget officer may recommend modification of any departmental budget
request under Subsection (2)(c)(i) before it is filed with the governing body, if each
department head has been given an opportunity to be heard concerning the modification.
(4) Each tentative budget shall contain the estimates of expenditures submitted by any
department together with specific work programs and other supportive data as the
governing body requests. The tentative budget shall be accompanied by a supplementary
estimate of all capital projects or planned capital projects within the budget period and
within the next three succeeding years.
(5) (a) Each tentative budget submitted in a county with a population in excess of
25,000 determined pursuant to Section 17-36-4 shall be accompanied by a budget
message in explanation of the budget.
(b) The budget message shall contain an outline of the proposed financial policies of
the county for the budget period and describe the important features of the budgetary
plan. It shall also state the reasons for changes from the previous fiscal period in
appropriation and revenue items and explain any major changes in financial policy.
18

(c) A budget message for counties with a population of less than 25,000 is
recommended but not incumbent upon the budget officer.
(6) The tentative budget shall be reviewed, considered, and tentatively adopted by the
governing body in a regular or special meeting called for that purpose. It may thereafter
be amended or revised by the governing body prior to public hearings thereon, except
that no appropriation required for debt retirement and interest or reduction, pursuant to
Section 17-36-17, of any deficits which exist may be reduced below the required
minimum.

Amended by Chapter 300, 1999 General Session
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17-36-9. Budget — Financial plan - Contents - Municipal services and capital
projects funds.
(1) (a) The budget for each fund shall provide a complete financial plan for the budget
period and shall contain in tabular form classified by the account titles as required by the
uniform system of budgeting, accounting, and reporting:
(i) estimates of all anticipated revenues;
(ii) all appropriations for expenditures; and
(iii) any additional data required by Section 17-36-10 or by the uniform system of
budgeting, accounting, and reporting.
(b) The total of appropriated expenditures shall be equal to the total of anticipated
revenues.
(2) (a) Each first-, second-, and third-class county that provides municipal-type
services under Section 17-34-1 shall:
(i) establish a special revenue fund, "Municipal Services Fund," and a capital projects
fund, "Municipal Capital Projects Fund," or establish a local district or special service
district to provide municipal services; and
(ii) budget appropriations for municipal services and municipal capital projects from
these funds.
(b) The Municipal Services Fund is subject to the same budgetary requirements as the
county's general fund.
(c) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(c)(ii), the county may deposit revenue
derived from any taxes otherwise authorized by law, income derived from the investment
of money contained within the municipal services fond and the municipal capital projects
fond, the appropriate portion of federal money, and fees collected into a municipal
services fond and a municipal capital projects fond.
(ii) The county may not deposit revenue derived from a fee, tax, or other source based
upon a countywide assessment or from a countywide service or function into a municipal
services fond or a municipal capital projects fond.
(d) The maximum accumulated unappropriated surplus in the municipal services fond,
as determined prior to adoption of the tentative budget, may not exceed an amount equal
to the total estimated revenues of the current fiscal period.
Amended by Chapter 329, 2007 General Session
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17-36-15. Adoption of budget
On or before the last day of each fiscal period, the governing body by resolution shall
adopt the budget which, subject to further amendment, shall thereafter be in effect for the
next fiscal period. A copy of the final budget, and of any subsequent amendment thereof,
shall be certified by the budget officer and filed with the state auditor not later than 30
days after its adoption. A copy, similarly certified, shall be filed in the office of the
budget officer for inspection by the public during business hours.

Amended by Chapter 230, 1999 General Session
Amended by Chapter 300, 1999 General Session
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17-36-16. Retained earnings — Accumulation — Restrictions — Disbursements.
(1) A county may accumulate retained earnings in any enterprise or internal service
fond or a fond balance in any other fond; but with respect to the General Fund, its use
shall be restricted to the following purposes:
(a) to provide cash to finance expenditures from the beginning of the budget period
until general property taxes, sales taxes, or other revenues are collected;
(b) to provide a fond or reserve to meet emergency expenditures; and
(c) to cover unanticipated deficits for future years.
(2) (a) The maximum accumulated unappropriated surplus in the General Fund, as
determined prior to adoption of the tentative budget, may not exceed an amount equal to
the greater of:
(i) (A) for a county with a taxable value of $750,000,000 or more and a population of
100,000 or more, 20% of the total revenues of the General Fund for the current fiscal
period; or
(B) for any other county, 50% of the total revenues of the General Fund for the current
fiscal period; and
(ii) the estimated total revenues from property taxes for the current fiscal period.
(b) Any surplus balance in excess of the above computed maximum shall be included
in the estimated revenues of the General Fund budget for the next fiscal period.
(3) Any fond balance exceeding 5% of the total General Fund revenues may be used
for budgetary purposes.
(4) (a) A county may appropriate fonds from estimated revenue in any budget period
to a reserve for capital improvements within any capital improvements fond which has
been duly established by ordinance or resolution.
(b) Money in the reserves shall be allowed to accumulate from fiscal period to fiscal
period until the accumulated total is sufficient to permit economical expenditure for the
specified purposes.
(c) Disbursements from the reserves shall be made only by transfer to a revenue
account within a capital improvements fond pursuant to an appropriation for the fund.
(d) Expenditures from the capital improvement budget accounts shall conform to all
requirements of this act as it relates to the execution and control of budgets.
Amended by Chapter 167, 2003 General Session
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77-32-302. Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court.
(1) Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the indigent shall
also be provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if the
indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial
probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if:
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense resources, or both
and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity to
be represented and provided defense resources.
(2) (a) If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including counsel
and defense resources, has established a county legal defender's office and the court has
received notice of the establishment of the office, the court shall assign to the county
legal defender's office the responsibility to defend indigent defendants within the county
and provide defense resources.
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense of an
indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract to provide
those services through a legal aid association, and the court has received notice or a copy
of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid association named in the contract to
defend the indigent and provide defense resources.
(c) If the county or municipality responsible for providing indigent legal defense,
including counsel and defense resources, has contracted to provide those services through
individual attorneys, individual defense resources, or associations providing defense
resources, and the court has received notice or a copy of the contracts, the court shall
assign a contracting attorney as the legal counsel to represent an indigent and a contracted
defense resource to provide defense-related services.
(d) If no county legal defender's office exists, the court shall select and assign an
attorney or defense resource if:
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys or resources; or
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of interest.
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or defense
resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of an
indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice of the contract, before
the court may make the assignment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible county or
municipality; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource.
(f) The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not be
considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting attorney
or defense resource.
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time.
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77-32-306. County or municipal legislative body to provide legal defense.
(1) The county or municipal legislative body shall either:
(a) contract to provide the legal defense, including counsel, defense resources, or both,
as prescribed by this chapter, and as available, through:
(i) a legal aid association; or
(ii) one or more defense associations or attorneys and qualified defense resources; or
(b) authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chapter by assigning a
qualified attorney in each case.
(2) A county may create a county legal defender's office to provide for the legal
defense, including counsel and defense resources or both, as prescribed by this chapter.
(3) A county legal defender's office may, through the county legislative body contract
with other counties and municipalities within a judicial district to provide the legal
services as prescribed.
(4) When a county or municipality has contracted under Subsection (l)(a) or a county
has created a legal defender's office as provided under Subsection (2) to provide the legal
counsel and defense resources required by this chapter, the contracted legal aid
association or attorneys, contracted defense resources, and the county legal defender's
office are the exclusive source from which the legal defense may be provided, unless the
court finds a compelling reason for the appointment of noncontracting attorneys and
defense resources, in which case the judge shall state the compelling reason on the
record.

Amended by Chapter 49, 2006 General Session
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